fix(verify): arm64 stack save, adaptive canary and host gating
Assisted-by: GLM 5.3
This commit is contained in:
+36
-6
@@ -16,21 +16,51 @@ import (
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// canary below SP, returning both the argument block (with results) and an
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// ABIReport.
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//
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// The callee is assumed to declare no local frame ($0 in its TEXT
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// directive); use CallCheckedFrame, or Kernel.CallFuncChecked which reads
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// the frame from the image, for a callee with a frame. A callee whose
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// frame extends past the fixed call margin would otherwise trip the canary
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// with perfectly legal writes.
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//
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// Not safe for concurrent use: only one JIT call may be in flight at a
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// time, the trampolines keep the saved registers in package globals.
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//
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// The architecture-specific parts live in abi_<arch>.s: enterJITChecked
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// plants sentinels in the registers the Go ABI fixes across calls (the
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// frame pointer and the goroutine pointer) before switching to the
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// prepared stack, and the raw return trampoline leaveJITCheckedRaw
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// compares them and records violations in abiResult.
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func CallChecked(fnAddr uintptr, args []byte) ([]byte, ABIReport, error) {
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return CallCheckedFrame(fnAddr, args, 0)
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}
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// CallCheckedFrame is CallChecked with the canary gap sized for a callee
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// that declares a local frame of frame bytes: the canary window is placed
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// below the deepest write a legal kernel may make, its own frame plus the
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// call margin, so only writes that go below the declared frame trip it.
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// Callers that already hold the function layout pass asm.FuncLayout.Frame.
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//
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// Not safe for concurrent use: only one JIT call may be in flight at a
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// time, the trampolines keep the saved registers in package globals.
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func CallCheckedFrame(fnAddr uintptr, args []byte, frame int) ([]byte, ABIReport, error) {
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report := ABIReport{}
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// Reset the global result.
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abiResult = 0
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// Prepare the stack: [canary][padding][leaveJITCheckedRaw][args...]
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// The canary sits below the initial SP, so the function would have to
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// write below SP to corrupt it.
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totalSize := redZoneSize + stackPad + 8 + len(args) + 64
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// The gap between the canary window and the entry stack pointer must
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// cover every write a legal kernel makes. Two parts:
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// - frame: the callee's declared local frame, which the ABI lets it
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// write anywhere in [SP-frame, SP).
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// - stackPad (64): the call margin. A kernel may CALL another
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// function, which pushes a return address below the frame and runs
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// a small prologue of its own; 64 bytes covers both. Callees'
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// own frames are not accounted: a kernel calling deep into other
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// frames can write below this gap without detection.
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pad := stackPad + frame
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// Prepare the stack: [canary][frame gap][leaveJITCheckedRaw][args...]
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totalSize := redZoneSize + pad + 8 + len(args) + 64
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stackMem, err := syscall.Mmap(-1, 0, totalSize,
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syscall.PROT_READ|syscall.PROT_WRITE, syscall.MAP_PRIVATE|syscall.MAP_ANON)
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if err != nil {
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@@ -43,8 +73,8 @@ func CallChecked(fnAddr uintptr, args []byte) ([]byte, ABIReport, error) {
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stackMem[i] = redZoneFill
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}
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// Return address and args after the canary and padding.
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retOff := redZoneSize + stackPad
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// Return address and args after the canary and the frame gap.
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retOff := redZoneSize + pad
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binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(stackMem[retOff:retOff+8], uint64(leaveCheckedPtr))
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copy(stackMem[retOff+8:], args)
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