feat(verify): add runtime ABI checks with sentinel registers and red-zone canary
Assisted-by: Qwen 3.8 Max Preview
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
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// Copyright (c) 2026 Petr Balvín <opensource@petrbalvin.org> (https://petrbalvin.org)
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// SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause
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//go:build amd64
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package verify
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import (
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"encoding/binary"
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"fmt"
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"syscall"
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"unsafe"
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)
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// abiResult records register-clobber violations detected by the ABI-checking
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// trampoline. Bit 0: BP clobbered. Bit 1: R14 clobbered.
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var abiResult uint64
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// savedBP holds the caller's frame pointer across the ABI-checked JIT call.
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// Referenced by enterJITChecked to satisfy go vet's save-before-clobber rule.
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var savedBP uintptr
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// leaveCheckedPtr is initialised by the linker from the GLOBL/DATA in
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// abi_amd64.s: it holds the raw address of leaveJITCheckedRaw (which has
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// no ABIInternal wrapper, so the JIT function RETs directly into it).
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var leaveCheckedPtr uintptr
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// enterJITChecked sets sentinels in BP and R14, switches to the prepared
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// stack and jumps to fn.
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//
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//go:nosplit
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func enterJITChecked(fn uintptr, stack uintptr)
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// leaveJITCheckedRaw is the raw return trampoline for ABI checks. Its
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// address is obtained from the GLOBL in abi_amd64.s (leaveCheckedPtr),
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// which points to the .abi0 code — NOT the ABIInternal wrapper that this
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// declaration would generate. The declaration exists solely to satisfy
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// go vet's "missing Go declaration" check.
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//
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//go:nosplit
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func leaveJITCheckedRaw()
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// ABIReport describes the result of an ABI-checking call.
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type ABIReport struct {
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BPClobbered bool // BP was modified by the function
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R14Clobbered bool // R14 (goroutine pointer) was modified
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RedZoneHit bool // the 128-byte red zone below SP was written
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}
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// OK returns true when no violations were detected.
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func (r ABIReport) OK() bool {
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return !r.BPClobbered && !r.R14Clobbered && !r.RedZoneHit
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}
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// String returns a human-readable summary.
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func (r ABIReport) String() string {
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if r.OK() {
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return "ABI clean"
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}
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s := "ABI violation:"
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if r.BPClobbered {
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s += " BP clobbered"
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}
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if r.R14Clobbered {
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s += " R14 clobbered"
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}
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if r.RedZoneHit {
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s += " red-zone written"
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}
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return s
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}
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// redZoneSize is the System V AMD64 red zone: 128 bytes below SP that a
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// leaf function may use without adjusting SP. Go does not use the red zone,
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// so any write there is a bug.
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const redZoneSize = 128
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// redZoneFill is the byte pattern used to detect red-zone writes.
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const redZoneFill = 0xA5
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// CallChecked invokes the function with ABI sentinels and a red-zone
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// canary, returning both the argument block (with results) and an ABIReport.
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func CallChecked(fnAddr uintptr, args []byte) ([]byte, ABIReport, error) {
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report := ABIReport{}
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// Reset the global result.
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abiResult = 0
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// Prepare the stack: [red-zone canary][padding][leaveJITCheckedRaw][args...]
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// The red zone sits below the initial SP, so the function would have to
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// write below SP to corrupt it.
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totalSize := redZoneSize + stackPad + 8 + len(args) + 64
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stackMem, err := syscall.Mmap(-1, 0, totalSize,
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syscall.PROT_READ|syscall.PROT_WRITE, syscall.MAP_PRIVATE|syscall.MAP_ANON)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, report, fmt.Errorf("verify: stack mmap: %w", err)
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}
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defer syscall.Munmap(stackMem)
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// Fill the red zone with the canary pattern.
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for i := 0; i < redZoneSize; i++ {
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stackMem[i] = redZoneFill
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}
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// Return address and args after the red zone and padding.
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retOff := redZoneSize + stackPad
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binary.LittleEndian.PutUint64(stackMem[retOff:retOff+8], uint64(leaveCheckedPtr))
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copy(stackMem[retOff+8:], args)
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stackBase := uintptr(unsafe.Pointer(&stackMem[retOff]))
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enterJITChecked(fnAddr, stackBase)
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// Read the register-clobber result.
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res := abiResult
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report.BPClobbered = res&1 != 0
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report.R14Clobbered = res&2 != 0
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// Check the red zone.
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for i := 0; i < redZoneSize; i++ {
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if stackMem[i] != redZoneFill {
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report.RedZoneHit = true
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break
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}
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}
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// Copy out the argument area.
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out := make([]byte, len(args))
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copy(out, stackMem[retOff+8:retOff+8+len(args)])
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return out, report, nil
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}
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