# Security policy

## Supported versions

Security fixes go to the newest release and to the `development` branch. Older releases
do not receive them.

| Version | Supported |
|---|---|
| 1.0.x | yes |
| older releases | no |

## Reporting a vulnerability

**Do not open a public issue for a security problem.** A public report tells everyone
about the flaw before there is a fix. Report it privately to
**opensource@petrbalvin.org**.

Include:

- the version or commit you tested, and the platform
- what the problem is, and what an attacker gains from it
- the smallest reproducer you have, ideally a test or a single command
- a suggested fix, if you have one

## What to expect

- A human reads the report, and you get an acknowledgement.
- You are kept informed while the fix is being made, and told when it ships.
- The fix is released before the details are published, and the timing is agreed with
  you.
- The reporter is credited in the release notes unless they ask to remain anonymous.

## Out of scope

- Findings that require the attacker to already run code as the user, or to have local
  access.
- Missing hardening with no demonstrated impact.
- Flaws in a third-party dependency: report them to that project, and to this one only
  when this project's use of it makes them reachable.
- Bypassing the per-IP rate limit from a rotating pool of addresses. nuntius has no
  CAPTCHA, no proof-of-work and no global rate limit; put a reverse proxy with those
  capabilities in front of it.
- Abuse from a compromised frontend that posts valid, allowlisted traffic at the
  configured rate. The token bucket bounds the volume; nothing else can distinguish it
  from real users.
- A compromised server. nuntius reads the SMTP password from the process environment,
  so anyone with root or `ps` access can read it from `/proc/<pid>/environ`.
- Downgrade of the SMTP transport on a STARTTLS port. Port 587 upgrades opportunistically
  by design; set `smtp.require_tls = true` to make the upgrade a hard requirement.
- Absence of DKIM signing and request signing. Outbound mail is signed by the SMTP
  provider, and message authenticity rests on the origin allowlist and the honeypot.
- Content carried by a configured Telegram channel. The submission summary reaches
  Telegram's servers, exactly as mail reaches the SMTP provider's; forms that must
  not share content with Telegram simply do not configure the channel.