# Security

> Status: threat model and security posture for the engine as implemented.

volumen is a small, file-based blog engine: a single Python process exposing a
read-only public JSON API and a session-authenticated admin, behind nginx. This
document describes the trust model, the controls in place, and the known
limitations.

If you find a security issue, please email **opensource@petrbalvin.org** rather
than opening a public issue.

## Trust model

- **Content authors are trusted.** Posts are written by authenticated admin
  users. python-markdown renders Markdown with a few pymdown-extensions
  extensions. The engine does **not** strip raw HTML from post bodies by
  default (authors are the trusted admin); if you need to accept posts from
  untrusted authors, add a sanitiser (e.g. `bleach`) before serving.
- **The public API is read-only.** It exposes published (non-draft) posts, tags,
  a feed and a sitemap. No public endpoint mutates state.

## Authentication

- Passwords are hashed with **scrypt** via `hashlib.scrypt` (`n=16384`, `r=8`,
  `p=1`, 32-byte key, 16-byte random salt). Verification uses
  `secrets.compare_digest` (constant-time) on the derived bytes.
- Login takes a **username + password**. The error message is intentionally
  generic ("Invalid username or password.") to avoid user enumeration.
- Sessions use **signed cookies** via Starlette's `SessionMiddleware`
  (`itsdangerous` TimestampSigner under the hood), marked **`HttpOnly`** and
  **`SameSite=Strict`**. The **`Secure`** attribute is added by
  `SecureCookieMiddleware` when `X-Forwarded-Proto: https` is observed (only
  honoured when `[server].trust_proxy = true`) so the cookie never travels
  over plain HTTP in production while local HTTP testing still works. The
  signing secret comes from `admin.session_key`; if it is shorter than 64
  bytes a random secret is generated per start (sessions then reset on
  restart, so set a stable key in production).
- A minimum password length of `[admin].min_password_length` (default `10`,
  must be `>= 8`) is enforced on the Settings page password-change form.

## Authorization (roles)

- Two roles: **admin** (full access, manages users) and **author** (posts and
  own account only).
- User management (`add`/`delete`/role change) is gated by `require_admin`
  **on the server**, not merely hidden in the UI.
- Safeguards prevent lockout: the **last admin** cannot be deleted or demoted,
  and a user cannot delete their own account or change their own role.

## CSRF

- Every state-changing form (`POST`) carries a per-session token
  (`secrets.token_hex(32)`), validated with `secrets.compare_digest`.
  Requests without a valid token get `403`.
- `SameSite=Strict` cookies provide a second, independent layer.

## Content Security Policy (admin)

All `/admin/*` responses send a strict **Content-Security-Policy** header
(via `CSPMiddleware`):

```
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
img-src 'self' data:;
font-src 'self';
connect-src 'self';
form-action 'self';
frame-ancestors 'none'
```

The inline allowances are required by the server-rendered admin (Jinja2
templates emit small inline `<script>` blocks and inline `style=""` attributes);
`frame-ancestors 'none'` prevents clickjacking via iframe embedding. The public
JSON API does not set a CSP — it returns no HTML, so none is needed.

## CORS and Host handling

- The public read API sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (read-only, no
  credentials) so any front-end may consume it. The admin sends **no** CORS
  headers and is same-origin only.
- volumen is intended to run behind nginx, which controls the `Host` header.
  Do not expose the Uvicorn port directly to the internet.

## File uploads and path traversal

- Uploaded media is stored under `content_dir/media` with a **sanitised,
  randomised** filename (`<hex>-<slug>.<ext>`), so uploads cannot overwrite
  each other or escape the directory.
- `GET /media/*` resolves names with `Path(...).name` and an explicit
  containment check, so `../` traversal cannot read files outside the media
  directory.
- Uploads are **rejected (HTTP 413)** when the file exceeds the
  `[admin].max_upload_bytes` ceiling (default **10 MB**, `10485760` bytes).
- Upload MIME type is **whitelisted** to `image/webp` and `image/avif`
  (`ALLOWED_UPLOAD_TYPES`); anything else returns **HTTP 415** with a
  conversion hint pointing at `cwebp` / `avifenc`. This matches the
  WebP/AVIF-only posture the engine serves content in and rejects binaries
  (PHP, executable, …) outright.
- Per-user profile photos go through the same upload validation and storage
  pipeline as post media.

## Secrets and files

- `config.toml` and `users.toml` may contain password hashes — keep them
  readable only by the service user (`chmod 600`).
- `volumen hash-password` reads the password from the terminal without echo;
  never pass passwords as command-line arguments.

## Transport

- Bind to `::1` (loopback) and terminate TLS at nginx. The browser ↔ nginx hop
  is HTTPS; the nginx ↔ Uvicorn hop is local.

## Dependencies

A small, audited set declared in `pyproject.toml`:

- Runtime: `fastapi[standard]` (FastAPI, Uvicorn, itsdangerous, Jinja2 transitively),
  `python-markdown`, `pymdown-extensions`, `tomli-w`, `python-multipart`.
  (`itsdangerous`, `Jinja2`, and `python-multipart` are pulled in directly
  too — see `pyproject.toml`.)
- Crypto: Python standard library (`hashlib`, `secrets`, `hmac`).
- Dev: `pytest`, `httpx`, `ruff`.

## Known limitations / non-goals

- **No rate limiting or lockout** on `/admin/login` at the application layer
  beyond an in-memory per-IP sliding window (`MAX_LOGIN_ATTEMPTS = 10` per 60s
  in `__init__.py`). nginx is the durable line of defence — see
  `docs/deployment.md`. Put nginx `limit_req` in front of `/admin/login`, or use
  fail2ban, to slow brute-force attempts.
- **No 2FA** and **no audit log**.
- **Raw HTML in posts is trusted** (see the trust model). There is no built-in
  HTML sanitiser.