# Security

> Status: threat model and security posture for the engine as implemented.

volumen is a small, file-based blog engine: a single Ruby process exposing a
read-only public JSON API and a session-authenticated admin, behind nginx. This
document describes the trust model, the controls in place, and the known
limitations.

If you find a security issue, please email **opensource@petrbalvin.org** rather
than opening a public issue.

## Trust model

- **Content authors are trusted.** Posts are written by authenticated admin
  users. kramdown renders Markdown and **passes raw HTML through** on purpose,
  so an author can embed HTML. The stored/served `html` is therefore only as
  safe as the people who can log in. If you need to accept posts from untrusted
  authors, add an HTML sanitiser before serving.
- **The public API is read-only.** It exposes published (non-draft) posts, tags,
  a feed and a sitemap. No public endpoint mutates state.

## Authentication

- Passwords are hashed with **scrypt** via `OpenSSL::KDF` (`N=16384`, `r=8`,
  `p=1`, 32-byte key, 16-byte random salt). Verification uses
  `OpenSSL.fixed_length_secure_compare` (constant-time).
- Login takes a **username + password**. The error message is intentionally
  generic ("Invalid username or password.") to avoid user enumeration.
- Sessions use signed cookies (`Rack::Session::Cookie`) marked **`HttpOnly`**
  and **`SameSite=Strict`**. The **`Secure`** attribute is added automatically on
  HTTPS requests (detected via `request.ssl?` / `X-Forwarded-Proto`), so the
  cookie never travels over plain HTTP in production. The signing secret comes
  from `admin.session_key`; if it is shorter than 64 bytes a random secret is
  generated per start (sessions then reset on restart, so set a stable key in
  production).

## Authorization (roles)

- Two roles: **admin** (full access, manages users) and **author** (posts and
  own account only).
- User management (`add`/`delete`/role change) is gated by `require_admin!`
  **on the server**, not merely hidden in the UI.
- Safeguards prevent lockout: the **last admin** cannot be deleted or demoted,
  and a user cannot delete their own account or change their own role.

## CSRF

- Every state-changing form (`POST`) carries a per-session token
  (`SecureRandom.hex(32)`), validated with `Rack::Utils.secure_compare`.
  Requests without a valid token get `403`.
- `SameSite=Strict` cookies provide a second, independent layer.

## Content Security Policy (admin)

All `/admin/*` responses send a strict **Content-Security-Policy** header:

```
default-src 'self';
script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';
img-src 'self' data:;
font-src 'self';
connect-src 'self';
form-action 'self';
frame-ancestors 'none'
```

The inline allowances are required by the server-rendered admin (ERB templates
emit small inline `<script>` blocks and inline `style=""` attributes);
`frame-ancestors 'none'` prevents clickjacking via iframe embedding. The public
JSON API does not set a CSP — it returns no HTML, so none is needed.

## CORS and Host handling

- The public read API sends `Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *` (read-only, no
  credentials) so any front-end may consume it. The admin sends **no** CORS
  headers and is same-origin only.
- `Rack::Protection::HostAuthorization` is disabled (`permitted_hosts: []`)
  because volumen is intended to run behind nginx, which controls the `Host`
  header. Do not expose the Puma port directly to the internet.

## File uploads and path traversal

- Uploaded media is stored under `content_dir/media` with a **sanitised,
  randomised** filename (`<hex>-<slug>.<ext>`), so uploads cannot overwrite
  each other or escape the directory.
- `GET /media/*` resolves names with `File.basename` and an explicit
  containment check, so `../` traversal cannot read files outside the media
  directory.
- Uploads are **rejected (HTTP 413)** when the file exceeds **10 MB**
  (`MAX_UPLOAD_BYTES`).
- Upload MIME type is **whitelisted** to `image/webp` and `image/avif`
  (`ALLOWED_UPLOAD_TYPES`); anything else returns **HTTP 415** with a
  conversion hint pointing at `cwebp` / `avifenc`. This matches the
  WebP/AVIF-only posture the engine serves content in and rejects binaries
  (PHP, executable, …) outright.
- Per-user profile photos go through the same upload validation and storage
  pipeline as post media.

## Secrets and files

- `config.toml` and `users.toml` may contain password hashes — keep them
  readable only by the service user (`chmod 600`).
- `volumen hash-password` reads the password from the terminal without echo;
  never pass passwords as command-line arguments.

## Transport

- Bind to `127.0.0.1` and terminate TLS at nginx. The browser ↔ nginx hop is
  HTTPS; the nginx ↔ Puma hop is local.

## Dependencies

A small, audited set: `sinatra`, `kramdown` (+ `kramdown-parser-gfm`),
`toml-rb`, `puma`, `rackup`. Cryptography uses the Ruby standard library
(`openssl`, `securerandom`).

## Known limitations / non-goals

- **No rate limiting or lockout** on `/admin/login` at the application layer
  (the engine does have an in-memory rate limiter, but nginx is the durable
  line of defence — see `docs/deployment.md`). Put nginx `limit_req` in
  front of it, or use fail2ban, to slow brute-force attempts.
- **No 2FA** and **no audit log**.
- **Raw HTML in posts is trusted** (see the trust model). There is no built-in
  HTML sanitiser.