petrbalvin
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Assisted-by: GLM 5.3 Flash
56 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
56 lines
2.4 KiB
Markdown
# Security policy
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## Supported versions
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Security fixes go to the newest release and to the `development` branch. Older releases
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do not receive them.
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| Version | Supported |
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|---|---|
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| 1.0.x | yes |
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| older releases | no |
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## Reporting a vulnerability
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**Do not open a public issue for a security problem.** A public report tells everyone
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about the flaw before there is a fix. Report it privately to
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**opensource@petrbalvin.org**.
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Include:
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- the version or commit you tested, and the platform
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- what the problem is, and what an attacker gains from it
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- the smallest reproducer you have, ideally a test or a single command
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- a suggested fix, if you have one
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## What to expect
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- A human reads the report, and you get an acknowledgement.
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- You are kept informed while the fix is being made, and told when it ships.
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- The fix is released before the details are published, and the timing is agreed with
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you.
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- The reporter is credited in the release notes unless they ask to remain anonymous.
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## Out of scope
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- Findings that require the attacker to already run code as the user, or to have local
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access.
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- Missing hardening with no demonstrated impact.
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- Flaws in a third-party dependency: report them to that project, and to this one only
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when this project's use of it makes them reachable.
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- Bypassing the per-IP rate limit from a rotating pool of addresses. nuntius has no
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CAPTCHA, no proof-of-work and no global rate limit; put a reverse proxy with those
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capabilities in front of it.
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- Abuse from a compromised frontend that posts valid, allowlisted traffic at the
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configured rate. The token bucket bounds the volume; nothing else can distinguish it
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from real users.
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- A compromised server. nuntius reads the SMTP password from the process environment,
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so anyone with root or `ps` access can read it from `/proc/<pid>/environ`.
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- Downgrade of the SMTP transport on a STARTTLS port. Port 587 upgrades opportunistically
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by design; set `smtp.require_tls = true` to make the upgrade a hard requirement.
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- Absence of DKIM signing and request signing. Outbound mail is signed by the SMTP
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provider, and message authenticity rests on the origin allowlist and the honeypot.
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- Content carried by a configured Telegram channel. The submission summary reaches
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Telegram's servers, exactly as mail reaches the SMTP provider's; forms that must
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not share content with Telegram simply do not configure the channel.
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